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In Biodun Jeyifo's readings of the Chibok girl’s captivity in The Nation magazine 
(Nigeria), he reveals his desperately optimistic insistence on collective substantive 
freedoms. Jeyifo's response to the situation is one of doubling complexity, pointing to the 
systemic violence that not only made the girls vulnerable, but also produces the young 
male perpetrator/victims who hold the girls captive and that holds the nation captive as 
well.  In this paper, Murphy argues that Jeyifo's complex reading of denied substantive 
freedoms in (what he might now call) a captive era in Nigerian history also provides a 
lens for removing the "familiar mask of the righteous judge" represented by the Western 
iteration of the #BringBackOurGirls movement. The paper interrogates the way in which 
Boko Haram tapped into the exaggerated post-9/11 fears that Islamic militants were a 
threat to Western values and freedom and provided evidence for Christian fundamentalist 
mythologies of a clash of civilizations. The paper suggests that the fervent discourse 
regarding the Boko Haram kidnappings point to a contest of fundamentalist ideologies, 
two opposing but tactically similar movements that ignore the structural lack of 
substantive freedoms that bring members into their fold.   
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In his introduction to a collection celebrating the works of Wole Soyinka (Wole Soyinka: 
Freedom and Complexity), Biodun Jeyifo argues that "the god of revolution chose to 
make a habitation in Soyinka's writings, not in the familiar mask of the righteous judge 
and executioner of the unjust, the exploiters and the despots, but in the confounding and 
contradictory doubleness of prophet and charlatan, altruist and misanthrope, victim and 
perpetrator, creator and destroyer" (xxi). It is in this space of uncomfortable doubleness 
and seemingly paradoxical "complexity" that Jeyifo's own conceptualization of Nigerian 
(and human) emancipation also resides. In his articles over the last few years for 
Nigeria's The Nation newspaper, Jeyifo lingers in something of an optimistic despair or, 
perhaps, a desperate optimism when he describes life and the contingencies of freedom in 
Nigeria. In a recent article on the 55th anniversary of Nigeria's independence, Jeyifo 
exclaims, "Oh, to be young and full of hope and a joyful openness to all of life's 
possibilities again" (“Those of Us”) but his work in that article (leveling a scathing 
critique against the current failures of Nigerian universities) and in the rest of his writing 
refuses the naivety of youthful openness in favor of a radical oppositional optimism that 
insists that only an end to systemic violence will provide freedom to Nigeria's citizens.   
Jeyifo's desperately optimistic insistence on substantive freedoms in 
his journalistic denouncement of the Chibok girls' captivity and the government’s 
response to it is particularly instructive on this point. On the night of April 14, 2014, 
Boko Haram descended on the Chibok Government Secondary School in Bornu State, 
Nigeria and captured 276 teenage girls. The leader of this self-proclaimed fundamentalist 
Muslim jihadists took responsibility for the kidnappings and announced that they would 
sell the girls as sex slaves (“Boko Haram Leader: We Will Sell”). The government’s 
response was slow and ineffective; two years later, the vast majority of the girls remained 
in captivity and the hope that they would be recovered safely by Buhari’s military had 
also been dashed.   
Jeyifo's response to Boko Haram and their enslavement of young women as a 
terrorist tactic is one of “doubling complexity.” Jeyifo focuses on the systemic crises 
resulting from Nigeria’s “predatory political order,” which create a doubling effect – the 
feminization of poverty and the masculinization of violence. Impoverished girls are 
vulnerable to predatory fundamentalists, to be sure. But Jeyifo expands his critique to the 
endemic “pathological maleness” (Jeyifo’s term) that holds young Nigerian men captive 
(“Boko Haram, Sex Slavery…”).  Those young men, in an effort to escape their own 
impoverished circumstances, hold the girls and the nation captive as well. The problem is 
a direct consequence of Nigerian politicians’ refusal to ensure the substantive freedoms 
of its populace. “With all [the] wealth in human and natural resources,” Jeyifo wonders 
how there can be “so much violence, insecurity and suffering in our country, especially 
for the majority of our peoples?” (“Between Ourselves”). Jeyifo repeatedly reminds his 
readers that the median age in Nigeria is 19 (“Boko Haram, Sex Slavery”), at the same 
time as 70% of Nigerians live in extreme poverty (“Voting Against One’s Interests”). As 
a result, young men and women are chronically unemployed and those who are lucky 
enough to have a job often work unpaid (“May 29, 2015”). In his exuberant response to 
Pope Francis’s speech in the U.S. Congress outlining the very systemic problems he has 
been lamenting in Nigeria, Jeyifo reminds us that this is globally endemic: “millions or 
even billions [of people] in all the countries of the world are being excluded from all that 
is vital for life lived in dignity and freedom from want” (“Pope Francis, The Talakawa 
Pontiff”). The result is a burgeoning class of young adults who are disconnected from 
opportunity, vulnerable to exploitation, and susceptible to persuasion by anyone who can 
offer them some semblance of freedom.  
In his response to the abduction, Jeyifo passionately expresses his solidarity with 
the mourning families and his desire for the young women to be set free. However, Jeyifo 
uses the moment of the Chibok abduction to ask for more than that the state 
#BringBackOurGirls, and he even correctly predicts that the state will be unlikely to 
emerge as the hero in this horror story. Indeed, Jeyifo’s concept of freedom is 
characteristically more complex than that which the Chibok girls’ rescue from their 
physical captivity would provide. Instead of merely demanding what Isaiah Berlin and 
others have dubbed a “negative freedom” from captivity, Jeyifo’s writing amplifies 
young men and women’s insistence on their right to “political, economic, and social 
power,” social safety nets, a quality education, and access to jobs as “leaders and opinion 
molders” (“Boko Haram, Sex Slavery,” “Those of Us”). He posits a conceptualization of 
freedom that is a modification of Amartya Sen’s capabilities approach, which suggests 
that freedom takes the “form of individual capabilities to do things that a person has 
reason to value” (Sen 56) and emerges most readily in environments free of tyranny, 
poverty, repression, and social oppression. It is from this insistence on substantive 
freedoms that Jeyifo’s desperate optimism grows.  
Because political parties, elite capitalists, and terrorists are so adept at dividing 
people along ethnic, religious, and class lines, however, Jeyifo seems to call for a 
movement of Nigerians who would together announce that “we can’t breathe,” echoing 
black Americans’ lamentation and rallying cry after Eric Garner’s death. He writes, 
reflecting on his 70th birthday, that people need to be deliberate in their struggle against 
the predatory political order, and they “must tirelessly organize and strategize to find the 
best means available to us for wresting control of our lives and our natural resources from 
the looters and their minions.” In dedicating his own life to this deliberate communal 
struggle for individual freedoms, he states, “the celebration of one life, or of one’s life 
can only and truly be an act of rededication if the one becomes the many, if beyond the 
person, beyond individual merit or achievement, there is cause for collective liberation 
from the forces that degrade and impoverish human life in our society and in our world” 
(“Celebration”). Essentially, Jeyifo posits another doubling concept: a notion (similar to 
Sen’s) of freedom as grounded in an individual’s capacity to achieve the lives they seek 
to pursue, but for Jeyifo, the consummate Marxist, those freedoms are most likely to be 
enacted when citizens seek them out in a unity of revolutionary spirit with one another. 
Jeyifo thus proposes a communal capabilities approach. This notion of freedom avoids 
the individualist focus of most conceptions of freedom for a sense of collective 
responsibility for ensuring that all citizens have the capability to do what they reasonably 
desire paired with a revolutionary Marxist foundation that supports revolutionary 
collective strategies to counter government interference in access to those capabilities.  
With significantly less complexity, Boko Haram seems to recognize these two 
driving desires among impoverished Nigerians – a drive to substantive freedoms and a 
drive to communal action in support of those freedoms. While Boko Haram boasts a 
diverse group of adherents, their ideology particularly appeals to those who have been 
disenfranchised, the “street hawkers, cobblers, blacksmiths, knife sharpeners, tailors” 
who don’t see their interests represented by the government elites (Walker 146). Islam 
provides the guise of community and support that young men seek and Boko Haram’s 
anti-government violence serves as the proxy for the political, social, and economic 
power that they lack. By representing religion and violence as the protection and weapons 
of the oppressed, Boko Haram mobilizes disaffected young northern Nigerians to action. 
But as Jeyifo notes, “religion is a mere excuse for self-serving, reactionary insurgencies 
in which faith is transmogrified into an opportunistic heresy to induce droves of 
disaffected male youths into their ranks” (“Boko Haram, Sex Slavery”). Boko Haram’s 
reliance on Islam is a façade for mobilizing disconnected young men to their geopolitical 
cause.   
While Boko Haram might be able to offer a semblance of the political authority 
young men seek, it appeals to women in a slightly different way. A gendered angle on 
Jeyifo’s critique reveals that the lack of substantive freedoms that push young men to 
Boko Haram are similarly push factors for young women. As Hilary Matfess suggests, 
women also found Boko Haram appealing because “the lives they were promised under 
the rule of Boko Haram were tangibly better than their lives as Nigerian citizens (Matfess 
6). Indeed, Boko Haram’s provision of food, services, and education appealed to both 
women and men. And yet Amnesty International indicates that between 2014 and 2015 
Boko Haram kidnapped as many as 2,000 women (Amnesty International 59), many of 
whom were forced into sexual servitude, forced marriage, and slavery. Boko Haram is 
one of two groups (the other being Islamic State) that explicitly and brazenly embraces 
slavery in the 21st century. They celebrate and practice sexual slavery, in particular, as 
their terroristic modus operandi. It seems necessary but almost naïve to ask: Why would 
an organization want to emblazon the two most universally reviled practices – rape and 
slavery – on their public banner? It is no coincidence that for those disaffected Nigerian 
young men, permission (and even encouragement) to practice slavery provides them 
precisely what they seek: power in a world in which they feel alienated and disconnected. 
This is an especially salient promise when marriage and children confer status but are out 
of reach because of economic disenfranchisement (Matfess 59). More specifically, 
though, slavery provides them power over an individual, it creates subordinates – women 
who are considered and treated as lower than they are, someone even more impoverished 
than they are. Practicing slavery does not empower them to undermine the system, nor 
does it provide access to political power or material well-being. Tapping into the 
psychology of poverty, Boko Haram instead provides young men the power to control 
individual women, which is merely a simulation of the real power of redress that they 
seek.  
That shadow of power seems to be enough to appease those who experience no 
substantive freedoms whatsoever. On the one hand, they frame their repulsion out of 
Maiduguri by the Nigerian military and local militias as “hijra” comparable to 
Mohammed’s exile from Mecca, thus conjuring a sense of victimization by summoning 
Islamic tradition that paints the Nigerian state as radically opposed to their rights (Walker 
156). In response, Boko Haram advertises their own power to fight back against 
oppression and assaults on Islam in their propaganda videos, featuring footage of their 
soldiers in action, armed with assault weapons, military artillery, and tanks. They show 
young men murdering other young men who were marked as infidels. They show crowds 
of submissive women who they claim will be married to their single soldiers. Thus, as 
Jeyifo suggests, the hyper-masculinization of violence and the meager authority afforded 
them through the enslavement of women helps project a false sense of escape from the 
poverty that emasculates them.  
When the government responds by engaging Boko Haram in traditional combat 
instead of providing substantive freedoms to the young men of Northern Nigeria, they 
mistake the battle for the battleground. Fighting the Nigerian government in this way 
only serves to reinforce the masculinization of violence and the simulation of freedom 
that can be won through it. As Jeyifo astutely suggests, the revolution instead lies in 
addressing poverty, healthcare, employment. The young male minds held captive by 
Boko Haram will only be freed when they are granted opportunities for power that grow 
from political participation and economic opportunity instead of an assault rifle. 
 
But it is not only impoverished Nigerian young men and women who have been 
captivated by Boko Haram’s propaganda machine. The terrorist group’s other striking 
victory has been captivating Western audiences. Boko Haram’s messaging since 2009 
(when Abubakr Shekau rose to power after the death of founding leader Mohammed 
Yusuf) has often been preoccupied with an outward-facing message. Boko Haram 
advertises – not just to Nigerians but to everyone in the world – that they are using 
women as “sex slaves” and that they will “sell them off” because “there is a market for 
selling girls” (“Boko Haram Leader: We Will Sell”).  
Their commonly used name suggests that they condemn Western beliefs and 
practices at home and abroad – boko, which means “misleading or false” and is 
colloquially used in the phrase karatun boko to mean misleading non-Islamic teachings, 
is haram or forbidden (Bargery). Their official name (before declaring allegiance to IS 
and becoming Islamic State West Africa Province) was Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati 
wal-Jihad, a name that asserts that they are people committed to the prophet’s teachings, 
the dissemination thereof, and jihad in the name of those teachings. At its very core, 
Boko Haram’s project is to undermine Western ideologies and educate the world in the 
teachings of Islam, so their messaging to the West is central to their recruitment of 
disconnected Nigerian men.  
To be sure, Shekau threatens the presidents of Nigeria, the governors of Bornu 
state and other local officials in his videos. He complains that too many Muslims in 
Nigeria have fallen prey to Western ideologies. Shekau also regularly addresses the “non-
believers of the world, especially the tyrants of United States, France, and Germany” as 
the intended audience of his videos (“Video Shows”). Around the time of the Chibok 
kidnapping, Shekau’s threats were aimed less at the enemy within Nigeria’s borders to 
the ideologies of the global north. He declares that neither Obama, Hollande, Netanyahu, 
Ban Ki Moon, nor Queen Elizabeth can kill him and that Boko Haram will continue to 
govern an Islamic caliphate and pursue the teachings of the Koran despite all their efforts 
(“Boko Haram Leader Dismisses Reports”). After denouncing disbelievers of all stripes, 
the Saudis, the Shias, and democracy, and insisting that he does not need their approval, 
Shekau smugly lists his tactics for global domination: “We will kill!! We will hold 
slaves!! We will sell!!” (“Shekau Makes Takfeer”). Though he only briefly allowed his 
delusions of grandeur to extend to threatening the United States directly, he has always 
been aware that his tactics (for instance saying that he will himself marry a girl of 9 or 12 
years of age) are nearly universally reviled and that he is thereby explicitly challenging 
Western norms and mores in his pronouncements. Even the Islamic State denounced 
Boko Haram’s tactics and remotely, but very publicly, announced that they were 
installing new leadership for Boko Haram. In August of 2016, Abubakr Shekau reiterated 
his claim to leadership of Boko Haram, saying that regardless of what Islamic State may 
say about his practices, he cannot abide by anyone who disobeys Koranic doctrines by 
“dwell[ing] in the society with the infidels without making public his opposition or anger 
against infidels” (“Boko Haram: Abubakar Shekau Reappears”). Shekau’s interpretation 
of the Koran suggests that it is compulsory that he denounce so-called “Western” 
behaviors and practices in Nigeria and openly and directly condemn the West for 
promoting these behaviors globally. The claims Boko Haram makes in their videos about 
kidnapping, raping, and enslaving young girls ups the ante. They contend that they are 
undoing Western education through the most forceful forms of “conversion” and thus 
asserting themselves as the most radical defenders of the faith. Through this doubling 
attack, they play on the most salient of post-9/11 fears in the West – that fundamentalist 
Islam will destabilize Western ideology in countries like Nigeria and threaten Western 
hegemony worldwide.  
If Shekau’s goal was to strike terror in the hearts of Westerners, he succeeded.  
The spectacle of power exhibited by kidnapping and enslaving teenage girls woke 
Westerners up to Boko Haram’s existence. Through the promotion of these particularly 
heinous acts, Boko Haram evokes a terror response through invoking sexual slavery – a 
practice that has recently gained significant attention and has risen to be considered 
perhaps the most abhorrent, and almost certainly the most sensationalized, crime against 
humanity. For onlookers in the West, the specter of “sex slavery” evokes an image of 
absolute terror – a life utterly disarranged by the power of strangers, an inescapable fate 
of absolute servitude, community shaming for compulsory actions, physical violation – a 
life without freedom of any kind.  It plays on the most potent of democracy’s myths, the 
notion that people are essentially free by birthright, and it calls into question the nature 
and accessibility of freedom in democratic states.  
Boko Haram tapped into the exaggerated post-9/11 fears that Islamic militants 
might descend upon innocent Christian children in the night and steal them away; they 
made what was otherwise a myth a well-publicized (though still anomalous) reality. And 
thus, Boko Haram’s announcement that they are called by the prophet to embrace sexual 
slavery shook unsuspecting armchair activists the world over. When the 
#BringBackOurGirls activist movement hit the scene in the United States, it particularly 
captured the imagination of American Christians. Though there have been hundreds of 
other people kidnapped by Boko Haram and thousands killed, and though there are 
kidnappings and murders and sexual slavery both at home and abroad nearly every day, 
the Chibok girls’ abduction into a life of sexual slavery spoke intimately to the concerns 
of Western Christians. Many, such as Teju Cole, derided the Western response to the 
Chibok girls’ disappearance as simply clicktivism, the self-congratulatory tendency of 
21st century Americans to conflate effective social justice action with supporting a cause 
by merely clicking a button (Mackey). Indeed, social media hastened the spread of 
awareness of the Chibok girls’ disappearance and thousands of Americans acted upon 
their manufactured horror for the girls through ineffective and superficial online 
“actions” geared toward sharing basic information rather than creating a sustainable 
response. 
Superficial social media engagement aside, I argue that a significant motivation 
for Americans latching on to this particular iteration of violence in Nigeria is linked to an 
influential strain of the current anti-slavery movement, which generates and maintains 
Christian anxieties about the end of Western hegemony and the rise of a Huntingtonian-
style “clash of civilizations” battle between Christianity and Islam. Powerful American 
neoliberal think tanks mobilize the specter of Islamic slavery to mobilize political will in 
the White House to commit troops to intervene in military conflicts (as Balogun Jumoke 
also noted of the Chibok response). They focus particular attention on conflicts in Africa 
– Sudan, Uganda, and now Nigeria – as a way of stoking anti-Islamic sentiments, even 
when it is counter-intuitive, as in the case of child soldiering in Uganda, which they 
blamed on Islam rather than on messianic Christianity (Murphy 103). The Institute for 
Religion and Democracy, a think tank that works to end the persecution of Christians 
worldwide, for instance, took as its poster child a Ugandan female child soldier, in an 
effort to trump up support for political and military intervention in Uganda that would 
focus on connections to Sudan and Omar al-Bashir (McDonnell and Akallo 102, 117). 
Christian Solidarity International’s (CSI) programs to free slaves from Sudan was 
exposed as a sham when it was found that they were “redeeming” people who were 
actually only acting as slaves and were in fact providing funds for weapons for South 
Sudan’s SPLA forces to liberate themselves from Sudan (Skinner 92). American Anti-
Slavery Group (AASG), led by former deputy director of the Committee for Accuracy in 
Middle East Reporting in America, Charles Jacobs, joined forces with Christian 
Solidarity International in their redemption efforts, and focused all of their anti-slavery 
work in Muslim nations including Sudan and Mauritania because, as Jacobs argued, other 
liberals won’t stand up against “evil committed against non-whites” (Jacobs).  
Organizations like these appeal to armchair activists and avid churchgoers, who in 
genuine concern for the suffering of others feel compelled to act when they hear 
inflammatory narratives that suggest that Islam permits and perhaps even mandates 
slavery, forced conversion, and forced marriage, especially when it affects Christians.  
For some time, it seemed that the anti-slavery activists were exaggerating anecdotal 
evidence of isolated cases of slavery that were not in fact being justified as mandated by 
Islamic law. But then IS and Boko Haram provided the proof that this group of anti-
slavery fear mongers were seeking. When Boko Haram and IS flaunt their idiosyncratic 
enthusiasm for slavery and link it directly to their faith, they provoke Western Christian 
fundamentalists and provide fuel to the flames that these think tanks are fanning among 
U.S. citizens.   
Thus, I would suggest that U.S. interest in #BringBackOurGirls was so 
enthusiastic for reasons that are perhaps more significant than clicktivism can explain. 
#BringBackOurGirls, or more specifically the Chibok kidnapping itself, seemingly 
provides evidence of the think tanks’ false allegations of Islam’s commitment to slavery 
and the rabid mistreatment of women. When the US media picked up on the Chibok girls 
story, it was always sensational, and the sensationalized images the media produced 
added weight to the anti-Islamic claims. The early focus of many of the stories was 
typically on the girls’ Christian faith and practically never on the fact that Muslim people 
are also oppressed, kidnapped, and murdered by Boko Haram (see, for instance, Djadi), 
and certainly paid no more attention to the systemic oppression of impoverished 
Nigerians than they do of the systemic inequality that plagues their own country. Reports 
that included survivor voices and descriptions of their lived experiences among Boko 
Haram focused heavily on forced conversion to Islam (see Mackey) and on the 
bastardized version of Islam that Boko Haram professes as justification for slavery (see 
Bauer). CNN and other news outlets were quick to pick up on the news that a Chibok girl 
was responsible for a recent bombing in “a small village” but never recanted those 
statements when it was proven false, allowing Christian news outlets to continue 
spreading the myth that the Chibok girls (the captives who seemed to be deemed innocent 
enough to garner sympathy) are being transformed into suicide bombers and Muslim 
martyrs (see Abubakar and Ellis). Images of the Chibok girls as “wives,” “sex slaves,” 
and exposes of their pregnancies in captivity provided Time Magazine, The Daily Mail, 
and other publications the “humanitarian pornography” that satiates the media appetite 
for suffering (see McFarlan, Alter, Bauer). 
The end result is that media and activist organizations acted as megaphones for 
Boko Haram’s sensationalized portrait of themselves, which in turn encouraged 
fundamentalist Christian organizations to malign – and suggest intervention – in Nigeria 
in general. Christianity Today, a self-proclaimed monitor of global Christian persecution, 
who tracks the number of Christians who are martyred for their faith each year and 
speciously lists the top 50 countries where it’s “hardest to be a Christian,” now ranks 
Nigeria seventh in overall religiously-motivated violence and fourteenth for persecution 
in general. 36 of the top 50 worst Christian-persecuting countries are African nations, 
according to Christianity Today’s ranking system. In the top 20, only North Korea and 
Vietnam are included for reasons other than violence attributed to Muslims, and thereby, 
Islam in general. One of the authors of the report explicitly indicated that “the purpose of 
the report is to ‘create effective anger,’ leading people to pray and act on behalf of 
persecuted Christians” (Burgess). The end result, however, is a general panic about what 
is happening in Africa and in Nigeria specifically, and increased fear-mongering about 
the specter of Muslim terrorism.  
Similarly, Christian Solidarity International, who is infamous for those staged 
slave redemptions in Sudan, added Nigeria as one of its focus areas after declaring Boko 
Haram to be one of their main targets for intervention. They write on their website: 
“Powerful forces are trying to destroy Christianity in Nigeria. Please stand with us as we 
continue to stand with Nigeria’s Christians! A gift of $142 can provide a family of seven 
in northern Nigeria with mosquito nets, mattresses, soap and food for a month!” (“CSI 
Reaches Nigerian Christians”). While their gift packs do address basic needs of internally 
displaced people, the focus of their concern is not in the lack of substantive freedoms or 
the inaccessibility of work that youth in Northern Nigeria face. Instead, their focus is on 
protecting only Nigerian Christians and, more to the point, protecting and promoting the 
dominance of Christianity in Nigeria.  
This suggests a second reason why #BringBackOurGirls resonated so much in the 
U.S. fundamentalist Christian community – another iteration of what I call the “transitive 
property of suffering” (Murphy 108). It is no coincidence that Christian Solidarity 
International’s mission is based in the Corinthians verse that instructs: “If one part 
suffers, every part suffers with it.” (I Corinthians 12:26; see “About Us”). CSI calls upon 
their donors to imagine the suffering of others as their own. Similarly, the use of “our” in 
#BringBackOurGirls was tremendously powerful globally. In Nigeria, the use of the 
word “our” allowed allies to unite across geographical, ethnic, and religious lines. When 
it was adopted internationally, it inspired people to imagine the potential for global unity 
that can affect change. It fires up that desperate optimism that Jeyifo adheres to, which is 
required in the fight against all forms of terrorism and tyranny, but it does not speak to 
the revolutionary spirit central to Jeyifo’s thinking.  
Indeed, the unity that “our” inspired did not promote a radical assessment of the 
structural inequalities that allow Nigerians to be preyed upon by Boko Haram. Instead, it 
played directly into the identification strategies employed by those on the religious right 
to affect the “transitive property of suffering,” through which they convince American 
churchgoers to believe that their own lives and the lives of their families are at risk 
because the lives of the Chibok girls are. If they are “our” girls, then “our girls” are at 
risk. The conclusion suggested by these post-9/11 anti-Islamic projects is not one that 
critically examines the freedoms denied Nigerian youth who join Boko Haram or even 
the freedoms denied the young women abducted by them. Instead, the central concern is 
that American citizens are at risk of persecution and limitation on their freedoms.   
The discourse around the idea of “persecuted Christians” has gained enormous 
traction in the U.S., even within high-power government circles. Persecution.org, the 
website of a group called “international Christian Concern,” indicates that their objective 
is to be ‘your bridge to the persecuted church.” On their site the phrase “global 
persecuted church” is applied equally to the very real persecution of some Christians in 
Nigeria, on the one hand, and to the U.S. citizen who is the defendant in an “athiest law 
suit” that will force him to take his 230 foot cross off his lawn, and to the Kentucky 
family who engaged in a heated battle to get a Biblical course taught in the local public 
schools, and to the California citizens who are oppressed by the lack of prayer in their 
school board meetings, and to a NASA employee who has been banned from using the 
word “Jesus” in the NASA newsletter. Charisma Magazine, another online anti-
persecution site, advertises the film “God’s Not Dead” and its sequel, which suggest in 
their ads and trailers that “Faith is on trial in America” and that they will “arm Americans 
to make a case for Jesus.” They provide readings with suggestions for how they should 
“devil proof your family” (Berglund). The examples of enslaved Chibok or Yezidi girls 
are rhetorically employed evidence of the creep of Christian persecution in the U.S. 
instead of as way to contextualize and perhaps quiet the anxieties of lesser oppressions in 
Kentucky or California. 
The notion that we have to fight for “our” girls – those apparently helpless 
Christian women abroad and at home – pervades the discourse of these Christian 
fundamentalist groups who target a similarly disempowered, disconnected populace in 
the U.S. This identificatory aspect of the fundamentalist propaganda – the appeal to “our” 
own interests as Christians – allows them to mobilize people to international causes that 
they would otherwise ignore and provides them with a common enemy and a community 
of people in whose name they can fight for their own freedom. These organizations make 
U.S. churchgoers believe they are part of a persecuted minority so that they will be 
willing to wage a war on Islam. They focus on uneducated, rural, white supremacist 
mythologies about the purported decreasing relevance of white lives in order to garner 
support for their interventions in Africa, bringing impoverished Americans into their fold 
through similar tactics of appealing to their sense of displacement and lack of resources. 
The promise a simulation of “freedom” from Islamic oppression as a false antidote to the 
systemic wealth inequality that is the source of their followers’ real problems.  
And in the end, the focus on religion as the source of crisis in Nigeria simply 
serves to reiterate the claims of Boko Haram that they are acting for religious reasons.  
What is always a constant, whether it is Boko Haram or Christian Solidarity International 
who has produced the propaganda, is a deliberate and studied refusal to acknowledge the 
systemic failures that lead to such a crisis.  Western organizations point to Sharia and 
Islam (interchangeably) as the culprit, never paying any mind to the disturbing realities 
that Jeyifo points to regularly – the 70% of Nigeria’s citizenry who remain in abject 
poverty, the failure of the educational system, and most intimately tied to American 
interests and complicity, the extraordinary corruption that allows a resource rich nation to 
ensure such inequality. This lack of attention to systemic injustice is precisely what 
allows both fundamentalist Christians and Muslims to mobilize people through a façade 
of religious oppression rather than addressing the root causes of their oppression. Jeyifo's 
complex reading of denied freedom in a captive era in Nigerian history also provides a 
lens for removing the "familiar mask of the righteous judge" represented by the Western 
iteration of the #BringBackOurGirls movement. Creating a mythology of Nigeria’s 
monolithic Islamic terrorist state allows them to overlook the very same systemic 
problems that both Boko Haram and Nigeria’s own government does. 
Thus, I am suggesting that the fervent discourse regarding the Boko Haram 
kidnappings point to a contest of fundamentalist ideologies, two opposing but tactically 
similar movements that require and demand state violence as a mechanism of both their 
oppression and their mobilization.  The very violence that precipitates the engagement 
with the ideologies among the poor is replicated as the only response to their oppression. 
We must remain wary of those elites – Western and Nigerian alike – who conjure the 
suffering of Nigerian women, only to mobilize politically incendiary and racially 
motivated Islamophobic logic in the guise of human rights.   
In the face of this willful ignorance of the structural violence that is at the heart of 
this fundamentalist movement, is it possible to maintain the desperate optimism Jeyifo 
invokes? When our governments woefully fail their citizens and when violence is met 
with violence which is met with violence, what hope does the citizenry – either in Nigeria 
or the US – have that the revolutionary spirit can be ignited and prevail? Jeyifo holds up 
the public response to Ebola as a possible sign of human capacity to face a threat (a 
capacity they do not tend to have, says Jeyifo, when confronted with a seemingly 
intractable problem like corruption or poverty or terror).  But is there still a reason for 
hope?  How does Jeyifo maintain his desperate optimism?  
In his discussion of Eric Garner’s death, Jeyifo reminds us: “we must recognize 
this racism as an old, old racism that is on its last legs. It draws its strength and resilience 
from newer and more subtle forms of racism. And from its opponents who play into its 
hands by not recognizing that the fight against this old, hoary racism will be won only on 
the condition that we know and accept that when one black man or boy “can’t breathe” 
men and women of all races and social groups “can’t breathe” either” (“’I Can’t 
Breathe’”). If indeed it is a blatant discriminatory logic born of a desire for a sense of 
essential superiority that is at the heart of the fundamentalist discourses we are discussing 
here, then Jeyifo’s call to unity and identification in the face of systemic failures is 
important on both continents.   
 How does this identificatory process differ from that of those who would “wear 
the mask of righteous judge?”  Can a movement to address the radical inequalities and 
systemic injustices that affect so many youth in Nigeria and in the United States – male 
and female, Muslim and Christian – invoke identificatory strategies and the transitive 
property of suffering – such as we do when we collectively chant, “we can’t breathe” 
without having someone respond with the willfully ignorant “All lives matter”? Is it 
possible to mobilize unity between people through a focus on the substantive freedoms 
that so many on our planet lack, without it being coopted by those who would create 
more suffering? 
 Jeyifo’s writing inspires us to focus a global struggle on the root causes of 
disconnectedness, poverty, and slavery instead of on the tangible realities of individual 
lives in captivity. We must attend to the larger structural issues that dispossess people and 
locate power outside of violence.  Perhaps this is how we access t/hat “god of revolution” 
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